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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL McCARTHY,
Plaintiff and AppeUant,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, "THIS IS
THE PLACE" MONUMENT COMMISSION, JOHN D. GILES, Executive Secretary and Treasurer of the
said- Commission, and the following
n1emhers thereof: ORVAL W.
ADAMS, MARRINER W. BROWNING, GEORGE S. ECCLES, JOHN
F. FITZPATRICK, J. L. FIRMAGE,
EARLJ.GLADE,DUANE G.HUNT,
AR·THUR W. MOULTON, GEORGE
ALBERT SMITH, and TAYLOR
WOOLEY, ·
Defend(JJYbts and Respo~dents.

Case No. 8037

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF· F1\C·TS
This is an action to enforce payment for certain
work done on the "This is the Place" Monument. It was
brought in two causes of action, the first against th·e
State, the second against the ''This is The Place"
Monument Commission (also knuwn as ''This is The
Place'' Monum·ent Committee) and the members individually. Both causes seek to collect for the same charge.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The first cause of action (in which Plaintiff alleged
that the "This is The Place" Monument commission is
an agency of the State of Utah) was dismissed on motion
of the State, on the ground that the State had not consented to be sued. '~rhe second cause of action against
the commission and the members of it, was later dis. .
missed on the grounds that the issue raised was barred
by the rule of res adjudicata, due to the fact that the
same issue was presented to, and decided by, the United
States District Court some years prior.
The complaint in the Federal Court was amended
twice, the case being submitted on the second amended
complaint (Tr. 149), the Answer and Counterclaim (Tr.
134), the Reply (Tr. 124), and the Stipulation of F'acts
(Tr. 126), and was decided as shown by Memorandum
decision (Tr. 123). The Commission was sued as a voluntary association throughout (Tr. 184, 165, 149) and judgment was sought against it and its members. The members of the Commission or Committee were individually
named as defendants in the Amended (Tr. 165) and
Second Amended Complaints (Tr. 149).
The second cause of action of the case at bar is
almost a word-for-word copy of the second amended
complaint, in the Federal Court, the one on which the
Plaintiff went to trial and judgment in said Federal
Court.
It was contended by the plaintiff throughout the
Federal Court case that the Commission was a voJuntary
association while the defendants claimed it was an agency
of the State of Utah. The latter was contended in
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1notions to dismiss 'vhich were filed in the Federal Court
to each of the pleadings, the Complaint, the Amended
Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint (Tr. 184,
165, 149). It was also urged in Paragraph I of the initial
answer and in paragraphs I and II of the Affirmative
Defense therein, that the Con1rnission was an agency of
the State of TTtah. Almost the same words were used
in the Ans,ver and Counter-Clairn filed in the Federal
Court on December 13, 1948, to the Second Amended
Co1nplaint wherein the first two affirmative defens.es
submitted \Vere these :

"I
"That· this court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action for the reason that the matter
involved herein is not a controversy bet\veen citizens of.
different states in this that this suit is in fact against
the State of Utah and the State of Utah is not a citizen
of any state within the n1eaning and intent of the law
defined under this Court's jurisdiction.

"II
"That this Court has no jurisdiction over the persons
of these defendants for the reason that the "This is the
Place" Monument Commission is an agency of the State
of Utah, and the individual Defendants are sued in their
representative capacity as Executive Secretary and
Treasurer and as members thereof; and that the matter
involved is therefore one in which the State of Utah is
primarily concerned and that the State of Utah only is
concerned with and will be affected by any judgment
3
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rendered herein and that therefore the action is essenti'
ally an action against
the State of Utah."
These issues were submitted to the Court upon Stipulation (Tr. 126) which opens with these words:
"It is hereby stipulated by and between plaintiff and
defendant the following are the facts upon which jurisdiction of this Court is claimed and denied."
According to the order of the Federal Court (Tr~
123) the case can1e "on for hearing on the plea of the
defendants set forth in the answer ... ,
"that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy and
"lacks jurisdiction over the defendants ...
"it is ordered that the plaintiff's complaint .. be ....
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."
Lt will be observed that the case was, according to
Judge Johnson's n1emorandum decision, submitted following the filing of the stipulation of facts and oral argun1ent of counsel and upon the Court being fully advised
as to the premises. In the case on appeal, the Affidavit
of Irwin Clawson (Tr. 120) merely identifies the F:ederal
Court transcript which followed. No answer to the Con1plaint was filed nor was any Affidavit filed to clarify
or controvert' the Affidavit of the Plaintiff, for such
would open up the matters concluded by the Federal
Court decision.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE .·FEDERAL COURT HELD THAT THE COMMISSION WAS AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

4
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POINT TWO
THE FEDERAL COURT, IN HOLDING THAT THE COM~IISSION WAS AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
ALSO HELD THAT THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
WERE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE.

POINT THREE
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT ONE.
SUBPOINT A. A JUDGlVIENT OF DISMISSAL FOR
LA.CK OF JURISDICTION IS RES JUDICATA AS TO 'rHE
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION, AND AS TO ALL ISSUES UPON
\VHICH LACK OF JURISDICTION IS BASED.
SUBPOINT B. A HEARING ON THE MERITS OF
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT PREVENTED BY THE
LOWER COURT'S DECISION.

POINT F·OUR
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT TWO.
SUBPOINT A. EVEN IF THE FIRST COURT'S DECISION IS ENTIRELY ERRONEOUS, IT IS STILL RES
ADJUDICATA TO ANOTHER ACTION ON THE SAME
CAUSE.
SUBPOINT B. WHETHER DEFENDANT IS A COM1\IISSION OR A COMMITTEE MAKES NO DIFFERENCE.

POINT FIVE
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT THREE.
ON A CONTRACT MADE WITII A STATE AGENCY,
PLAINTIFF HAS NO RIGHT TO liA VE LIABILITY UNDER
IT DETERMINED BY A COURT.

POINT ONE
THE FEDERAL COURT HELD THAT THE COMMISSION WAS AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

At the top of Page 15 of appellants brief, it is
argued that since the F'ederal Court made no specific
finding that the Com1nission \vas an agency of the State
of Utah, that the judgment of dismissal on the grounds
5
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of lack of jurisdiction could have been based on the lack
of diversity of citizenship. Let us see if the facts bear
this out.
In the first paragraph of the answer to the first cause
of action set forth in the plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint ( Tr. 86) in the Federal Court, the defendants
admitted ". . . . that Plain tiff is a citizen and resident of
the State of California, ..... Defendants further admit
that the individuals named as defendants [which included
all who are defendants and respondents in the case now
on appeal before this Supreme Court] are members of
'This is the Place' Monument Commission and that said
tnembers are residents and citizens of the State of Utah."
There was no dispute of fact as to whether the
defendants were residents of another state than that of
the plaintiff. The dispute was not whether the individual
parties were citizens of different states, but whether the
real defendant was not the State of Utah and if such was
proven to be the case whether such real party at interest,
the State of Utah, was a citizen within the meaning of
the statute and the Constitution. That this was the real
issue is shown by that san1e ans,ver in the affirmative
defense ( Tr. 89) in the F'ederal Court wherein it is
alleged:

"I
"That this court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this action for the reason that the matter
involved herein is not a controversy between citizens of
different states in this that this suit is in fact against
the State of Utah and the State of Utah is not a citizen
6
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of any state within the meaning and intent of the law
defined under this court's jurisdiction.

"II
·~That

this court has no juridiction over the persons
of these defendants for the reason that the "This is the
Place" ~Ionument Co1nnrission is an agency of the State
of Utah and the individual Defendants are sued in their
representative capacity as Executive S.ecretary and
Treasurer and as· members thereof, and that the rnatter
involved is therefore one in which the State of Utah is
primarily concerned and that the State of Utah is concerned wi'th and will be affected by any judgment rendered herein and that therefore the action is essentially
an action against the State of Utah.

"III
"That as to the individual Defendants, nothing is
alleged or set forth from which the court could legally
fix any responsibility upon, or render any judgment
against, the individual defendants."
There was no dispute about the diversity of residence as between the plaintiff on the one hand and the
individual defendants on the other. That was not an
issue. The issue of lack of jurisdiction of the defendants
by the Federal Court was not as to individual parties, but
as to the real parties at interest, the plaintiff on the
one hand and the State of Utah on the other.
That was the issue and the only issue as to jurisdiction. There is no mystery a.s to how the Federal Court
reached its decision that it had no jurisdiction. There
7
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wa.s but one step involved. If the individual defendants
were the real parties at interest it was admitted that
there was a diversity of citizenship and thus jurisdiction.
If the State of Utah was the real party at interest there
was no diversity of citizenship and the court had no
jurisdiction. That was the sole point involved a.s to
jurisdiction. That wa:s the point decided by the Federal
Court. There is no difficulty in fathoming the reasoning
of the Federal Court. There was no issue of lack of jurisdiction involved axcept that the commission and the
individual n1embers thereof were or were not an agency
of the State ot Utah.

POINT TWO
THE FEDERAL COURT, IN HOLDING THAT THE COMMISSION WAS AN AGENCY OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
ALSO HELD THAT THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
WERE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE.

As pointed out above, the answer of these individual
defendants in the Federal Court admitted that the plaintiff was a citizen and resident of California and that all
of the individual defendants there (which includes those
in the case at bar before the Supreme Court) were citizens and residents of the State of Utah. It was also
admitted that the amount involved in the suit exceeded
$3000.00 (paragraph II, Tr. 86). So the only question
relating to jurisdiction was whether the real defendantat-interest "\Vas the individual defendants or the State of
Utah.
To hold that the State of Utah was the real defendant and to dismiss as to the individual defendants, who
8
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admitted they were subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Court, it \vas necessary for the later court to
hold that the individual defendants were not personally
liable on the obligation upon which suit was brought.
That was a necessary step in holding that it (the Federal
Court) had no jurisdiction, for unquestionably it had
jurisdiction if the individual defendants were liable personally.
Since the Federal Court passed on the question of
whether these individual defendants were p-ersonally
liable, can that issue be again litigated f
·• ... a fact or question actually and directly in
issue in a former suit, and there judicially passed
on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled, so far as concerns
the parties and cannot be further litigated in a
future action between them and their privies in
the same or in another tribunal, upon the same or
a different cause of action." In Re Evans 130 P.
217, 225, 42 Utah 282.
The question of the liability of the individual defendants has been adjudicated once and the issue found for
these defendants. It cannot be relitigated in the F'ederal
or any state court. It has been judicially determined
that the individual defendants· are not liable and question cannot be relitigated without going contrary to the
principal of res judicata.

POINT THREE
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT ONE.
SUBPOINT A. A JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL FOR
LACI{ OF JURISDICTION IS RES JUDICATA AS TO THE

9
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ISSUE OF JURISDICTION, AND AS TO ALL ISSUES UPON
WHICH LACK OF JURISDICTION IS BASED.

It is urged that the judgment on the merits must
be obtained for it to be res judicata. That is true so far
as the merits are concerned. But it is not true that a
judgment on the question of lack of jurisdiction is not
conclusive and final as to the sufficiency or insufficiency
of jurisdiction.
Suppose thP plaintiff had filed again in the Federal
Court on the same complaint, could he have relitigated
the question of "',.hether or not the Federal Court had
jurisdiction'
Suppose instead of filing first in the F'ederal Court,
the plaintiff had begun his action in the District Court
for Salt Lake County, and in that case that court had
found, as did Judge Johnson, that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the Co1nmission was a state agency and
the state had not given its consent to be sued, could the
plaintiff have thereupon filed a new case on the same
complaint before the same court and again litigated the
same issue of jurisdiction' Could he have "shopped
around" among the six divisions of the court until he
found a more acceptable legal climate' Or, having unsuccessfully submitted his case to all six judges, could he
still litigate the question of whether the Commission
was an agency of the state, that is, the question of jurisdiction, before any new judge who might be appointed or
elected' Would the litigation of the state agency question only come to rest when the statute of limitations
became a bar¥

10
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The staten1ent of the problem eou1pels the answer,
for if the plaintiff cannot continue to re-subn1it the san1e
question over and over again to the judges until the
limitations have run, then when is he barred~ Is it after
each judge of the six and their successors have decided
adversely~ If so why stop there~ vVhat rule of lavv
\vould make any successive decision a bar if the first one
did not f Obviously such is not the law. This Court has
spoken on the matter thusly:
''. . . The doctrine is a principle of repose, and
is largely based upon and in accordance with the
1naxim that no one ought to be twice vexed for
one and the same cause; and, as stated by Wells
in his vvork on I~es Adjudicata (section 2), chiefly
bears upon the parties and others privy to the
i1nmediate parties, and restrains them from litigating anew such matters as have previously been
dra\vn into controversy between them or those·
representing the1n, and have been authoritatively
decided by a competent tribunal. Hence the oftrepeated declaration that a fact or question actually and directly in issue in a former suit, and
there judicially passed on and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively
~ettled, so far as concerns the parties, and cannot
be further litigated in a future action between
them or their privies, in the same or in anoth-er
tribunal, upon the same or a different cause of
action." In R-e Evans, 130 P. 217, 225; 42 Utah
282, Mr. J-ustice Straup speaking for the Court.
The same doctrine was subsequently affirmed by
this court in Mathews vs. Mathews, in these words :
" 'The judgment of a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea,

11
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a bar or as evidence, conclusive, between the
sarne 'parties, upon the sarne rna tter directly in
question in another court'. 15 RCL 951, Sec. 429.
" 'The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought
not to be permitted to litigate the san1e issue
rnore than once; that, when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court
of cornpetent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for
such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, so long as it rernains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity
with them in law or estate.... Public policy and
the interest of litigants alike require that there
be an end to litigation, and the peace and order of
society demand that matters distinctly put L:
issue and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction as to parties and subject matter shall
not .be retried between the same parties in any
subsequent suit in any court.' 15 RCL 953, Sec
430" Mathews vs. Mathews, 132 P. 2nd 111, 114;
102 Utah 428.
"In stating the doctrine of res judicata, the
courts usually refer to the fact that the judgment
sought to be used as a basis of the doctrine was
rendered upon the merits, since it is a general rule
that a judginent rendered on any grounds which
do not involve the 1nerits of the action rnay not
be used as a basis for the operation of the doctrine
of res judicata. Under this rule, an adjudication
on grounds purely technical, where the merits
cannot come into question, is limited to the point
actually decided, and does not preclude the maintenance of a subsequent action brought in a way
to avoid the objection which proved fatal in the·
first action. A.s to the technical point decided,
however, the judgment is CQnclusive, even though
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it is not conclusive as to the m.erits of the enti.re
controversy." (emphasis added) 30 Am. Jur. 944,
Sec. 208.

"A dismissal for want of jurisdiction is conclusive of the fact of want of jurisdiction, but it
is no adjudication of the merits and will not bar
another action for the same cause." 50 C.J.S. 72,
S-ee. 638.
Freeman has this to say on the subject :
~'Questions of jurisdiction may become res
judicata the same as any other matters of law or
fact where they are properly in issue or are n-ece:ssarily involved and determined." 2 Freeman on
Judgments (5 Ed.) Sec. 710. (emphasis added).
This narrower application of the principal of res
judicata is discussed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Forsyth case as follows :
''Though the form and causes of action be ·different, a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect to any essential fact or question
in the one action in conclusive between the parties
in all subsequent actions. Cromwell vs. Sac
County, 94 U. S. 351 (24 :195); Mason Lumber Co.
vs. Buchtel, 101 U. S. 638 (25 :1074); Stout vs.
Lye, 103 U. S. 66 ( 26 :428) ; Nesbitt vs. Riverside
Independent Dist., 144 U. S. 610 (36 :562); Johnson Co. vs. Wharton, 152 U. S. 252 (38 :429); Last
Chance Min. Co. vs. Tyler Thtiin. Co. 157 U. S. 683
(39 :859)." Forsyth vs. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506,
41 L. Ed. 1095 at 1100.
The same subject was treated by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the following language:
"The general principle· announced in numerous cases is that a right, question, or fact dis13
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tinctly put in issue and directly detern1ined by a
court of co1npetent jurisdiction, as a ground of
recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit
between the san1e parties or their privies; and
even if the second suit is for a different cause
of action, the right, question, or fact once so
deter1nined must as, between the same parties or
their privies, be taken as conclusively established,
so long as the judgment in the first suit remains
unmodified." Southern Pacific R. Co. vs. United
States, J 68 U. S. 1, 48; 42 L. Ed. 355, 377; 18 S.
Ct. 18.
The precise point of a decision on a question of jurisdiction was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Baldwin vs. Iowa State Traveling
Men's Asso., 283 U. S. 522; 75 L. ed. 1244, 51 s. Ct. 517;
where Baldwin brought an action in Missouri and the
defendant con1pany appeared specially and objected to
the jurisdiction. The court over-ruled the objection and
the company permitted the trial to proceed without further appearance. The plaintiff then sued in Iowa on the
judgment obtained in the Missouri ease and the company
attempted to again litigate the issue of jurisdiction of
the Missouri Court. The United States Court in Iowa
upheld the company's contention that the Missouri Court
had no jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals did also,
but the Supreme Court held that the company had submitted that issue to the Missouri Court and its decision
was res judicata.. The latter court said:
"The substantial matter for determination is
whether the judgment amounts to res judicata- on
the question of the jurisdiction of the court_which
rendered it over the person of the respondent.....

14
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The special appearance gives point to the fact
that the respondent entered the Missouri court
for the very purpose of litigating the question of
jurisdiction oYer its person. It had the election
not to appear at all. If, in the absence of appearance, the court had proceeded to judgment and
the present suit had been brought thereon,
respondent could have raised and tried out the
issue in the present action, because it would never
have had its day in court with respect to jurisdiction. (Citations) It had also the right to appeal
from the decision of the Missouri District Court
as is shown by Harkness vs. Hyde 98 U. S. 476, 25
L. EL:. 237, supra and the other authorities cited.
It elected to follow neither of those courses, but,
after having been defeated upon full hearing in
its contention as to jurisdiction, it took no further
steps, and the judgment in question resulted.
'"Public policy dictates that there be an end
of litigation; that those who have contested an
issue shall be botuld by the result of the ·contest,
and that matters once tried shall be considered
forever settled as betweei1 the parties. We see
no reason why this doctrine should not apply in
every case where one voluntarily appears, presents his case and is fully heard, and why he
should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter
concluded by the judg-.t:nent of the tribunal to which
he has subn1itted his cause."
In Ripperger vs. A. C. Allyn & Co., 113 F. 2nd. 332-t
where the first action was disn1issed (on defendant's
motion) for lack of jurisdiction, and then a second action
was begun, the plaintiff appealed and admitted that a
decision in favor of jurisdiction was res judicata, the
court noted that fact and then states (333):

15
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"But he advances the contention that a decision tha.t jurisdiction is lacking leaves the parties
as though no action had ever been brought and
therefore presents no bar to a subsequent action
even in the san1e court. We think the argrnnent
ingenious but unsound. As Mr. Justice Brandeis
remarked in American Surety Co. vs. Baldwin,
supra ( 287 U. S. 156, 53 S. Ct. 101, 77 L. Ed. 231,
86 A. L. R. 298):
"'The principles of res judicata apply to
questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues.
No reason is apparent why the rule should be less
applicable to a decision denying jurisdiction than
to one sustaining it.'"
''Decisions on mere questions of law do not
operate as res judicata when divorced from the
particular subject matter to which the law was
applied, though they may be followed as precedents under the doctrine of stare decisis. But
where the parties and the matter to be determined
are identical the former adjudication is res jndi:cata ·and conclusive of the la'v as applied to that
matter, even though it is afterwards determined
that the law was erroneously adjudicated or
applied." 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.)
S·ec. 709.
Now returning to the point raised above in the
quoted portions of American Jurisprudence, Corpus
Juris Secundum and many of the authorities referred to,
the judgment of dismissal because of lack of jurisdiction,
while not res judicata. of the merits of the case, is conclusive as to the matters upon which the ruling of no
jurisdiction is based. As American Juris prudence says
at another point:
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"'Ho,vever the sueeessful maintenance of a
second action on a different cause of action may
be precluded by a prior conclusive adjudication
a~ to a particular issue involved in both actions."
30 An1. J ur. 916, Soo. 172.
In United Shoe vs. U. S., 258 U. S. 451, 66 L. Ed. 708
at 718, the court treated of this subject in these words:
"'In other words, to determine the effect of a
former judg1nent pleaded as an estoppel, two
questions must be answered: (1) Was the former
judgment rendered on the same cause of action~
(2) if not, was some n1atter litigated in the former
suit detern1inative of a matter in controversy in
the second suit"? To answer these questions we
must look to the pleadings making the issues, and
&-x;anline the record to determine the questions
essential to the decision of the former controversy."
Appellant cites the case of Gihson vs. Utah State
Teachers' Retirement Board, 105 P. 2nd 353, 99 Utah 576,
to sustain his claim that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not res judicata.
The Gibson case in the Supreme Court was brought
to obtain a writ of mandamus. In the prior case in· the
lower court, Gibson sued under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The first case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. According to the Gibson case decision in the
Supreme Court, no finding or determination was rnade
in District c·ourt as to the status of the plaintiff, but an
order was entered dismissing the action "presumably on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction since that was the
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only issue raised or heard there," according to the
Supreme Court decision. It then continued as follows:
"Such action was, and is, not res judicata." Evidently
there was no holding by the District Court that the plaintiff in that case was or was not a teacher covered by th~
Retirement Act. Can it be said that such a decision as
that of the District Court, which refuses to decide either
one way or the other, was res judicata of the issues there
presented' To have held the Supreme Court was
estopped by the decision of the District Court was to
read into the District Court decision something which.
was not there. The Supreme Court could not hold the
District Court decision was binding when it decided
none of the issues presented by the complaint. However,
if the question of jurisdiction of the District Court had
been important in the upper court, then the' District
Court decision would have been binding under the doctrine of res judicata. But such was not the case·. Hence
the upper court felt and held that, as to the issues presented in the application for the writ of mandate, the
decision of the lower court holding that it had no jurisdiction, was not con trolling.
It is submitted that the decision that the court 'vas
without jurisdiction of the case in the Federal Court
because the Commission was a state agency and because
the individual defendants were not personally liable is
binding on the lower court in the case at bar when the
question of state agency and personal liability is again
involved.
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SUBPOINT B. A HEARING ON THE MERITS OF
PLAINTIFF'S CLAil\ti IS NOT PREVENTED BY THE
LOWER COURT'S DECISION.

The Federal Court did not attempt to pass on the
1nerits of the Plaintiff's claim but only on the narrow
question of 'vho was liable for any claim that existed.
That Court held that the individual members of the ComInission 'vere not liable because the Commission was a
state agency. Whether the plaintiff had or had not performed his contract was not decided. The same thing was
true of the decision in the low court in the case at bar,
the merits were left unaffected. The plaintiff can still
pursue his remedy before the State Board of Examiners
and have the merits of the claim passed on by that body.
But he has no right to have his claim adjudicated by a
court, 'vhether state or federal. This is true in any
contract with the state. And the F·ederal Court determined that, since the Commission was a state agency,
it could not be brought to bar. S-o plaintiff's assumption .
in his Point One that he has the right to litigate the
n1erits of his claim before a court, is erroneous.
POINT F:OUR
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT TWO.
SUBPOINT A. EVEN IF THE FIRST COURT'S DECISION IS ENTIRELY ERRONEOUS, IT IS STILL RES
AD.JUDICATA TO ANOTHER ACTION ON THE SAME
CAUSE.

In Appellant's Point Two it is argued that the Third
District Court erred in its decision because the allegation
of the Plaintiff is his c·omplaint and Affidavit were
uncontroverted. It is not claimed anywhere that the
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cause as presented to the Third Judicial District Court
against the Commission and against the members thereof
is not the identical case which was presented to the
United States District Court. Nor could it be so asserted
for, as shown above, the second cause of action, the one
before the lower court on this hear.ing, is almost a word-.
for-word copy of the second amended complaint in the
Federal Court case, the one on which the sarne parties
submitted the same issues on an agreed statement of
facts before Judge Tillman D. Johnson.
It is argued in Point Two by Appellant that the Commission was not an agency of the state, but a voluntary
association. This is the same issue which was presented to
the Federal Court. That court ruled against the appe~
lant. Nevertheless, let us assume for the sake of argument, that the F'ederal Court was 100% wrong in its
ruling on the cause as submitted on the stipulated facts.
Would that make any difference~
"These decisions constitute application of the
general and well settled rule that a judgment, not
set aside on appeal or otherwise, is equally effective as an estoppel upon the points decided,
whether the decision be right or wrong. Cornett
vs. Williams, 20 Wall. 226, 249, 250, 22 LEd. 254,
258, 259; Wilson vs. Deen, 121 U. S. 525, 534, 30
L. Ed. 980, 982, 7 S. Ct. 1004 ; Chicago, R. I. & P.
R. c·o. vs. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 617, 70 L. Ed.
757, 762, 53 A.L.R. 1265, 46 S. Ct. 420~ 26 N.C.C.A.
971. The indulgence of a contrary view would
result in creating elements of uncertainty and in
undermining the conclusive character of judgInents, consequences \vhich it was the very purpose of the doctrine of res judicata to avert."
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l~eed

vs. Allen, :2~6 lT.S. 191, 76 L. Ed. 1054, 52
S. Ct. 532, 81 A.L.R. 703, Mr. Justice Sutherland
speaking for the Court.
In this connection, it is declared that the
doctrine of res judicata is not dependent upon the
correctness of the judgment, or of the verdict or
finding on \Yhich it is based." 30 Am. J ur. 939,
Sec. 198. To sa1ne effect, 50 C. J. S. 159.
-

H

SUBPOINT B. WHETHER DEFENDANT IS A COMl\IISSION OR A COTh'IlVIITTEE J.\IIAKES NO DIFFERENCE.

It is suggested that there is some help to be obtained
for Appellant fron1 the fact that the body set up by the
State was a Committee while the one sued is called a
Commission. vVhat difference does it make~ In the
case at bar it is alleged in the Complaint, "That the
defendant Cormnission is a voluntary association. . . . "
and four lines below that "defendant is also kno,vn as
.... Committee." (Tr. 4) Plaintiff alleges that they are
one and the same. That is not controverted. What of the
play in the Brief revolving around the two~ Does the
Plaintiff no'v wish to prove that they are not one and the
same after having alleged they are~
Whether the Commission or Committee properly
pursued their authority so as to obtain the approval of
the State Building Board, or not, or to let building contracts without the approval of the Department of Engineering or Finance Commission, etc., cannot effect the
issue now. They were matters to be raised in the Federal
Court and they were. The stipulation (Tr. 126) of agreed
facts filed in the Federal Court goes into those matters
in even more detail than does appellant's brief. All of
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those things were considered by Judge Tillman D. Johnson when he decided that the Commission was a state
agency. Can the plaintiff, having lost on that issue in
the Federal Court, raise it again in that or another
court~ The authorities cited above deny that right. Why
should those issues, having been fully presented and
argued, and submitted to the Federal Court, be again
relitigated in the State Court~

POINT FIVE
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS POINT THREE.
ON A CONTRACT MADE VliTH A STATE AGENCY,
PLAINTIFF HAS NO RIGHT TO HAVE LIABILITY UNDER
IT DETERMINED BY A COURT.

Plaintiff in concluding says he is entitled to have
his claim adjudicated by the lower court. But in this, we
submit, he is mistaken. There is no such right. "The
state cannot be sued unless it has given its consent or
has waived its immunity," State vs. District Court, 78 P.
2nd 502, 504, 94 Utah 384; Wilkinson vs. State, 134 P.
626, 631, 42 Utah 483; Campbell vs. State Road Commission, 70 P. 2nd 857, 95 Utah 242.
This rule has already been acknowledged in the case
at bar and, in the absence of an allegation in the Complaint that the State has submitted, the action against
the State of Utah has been dismissed.
The plaintiff has mistaken his remedy. It lies and
always has been, before the State Board of Examiners.
For some reason he seems loath to seek his redress there,
but that is where his remedy and reimbursement lies, if
he is entitled to any.
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And having once submitted to a Court his claim of a
right to hold the individual members of the Commission,
he cannot relitigate the same issue again. His right to
recover remained unimpaired by the Federal Court decision and by the judgment from which he appealed, but
not his right to claim individual liability. That point was
fully litigated and disposed of in the Federal Court. It
cannot again be brought into issue.
It is subn1itted that the decision of the lower court
m the case at bar was advisedly made and should be
affirn1ed and this appeal dismissed.
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